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Abstract. Project management in the construction sector is a complex and uncertain process and companies tend to look 
for the lowest value in the procurement of services and materials. However, contractors do not share the necessary infor-
mation with the contracted parties and thus give rise to the asymmetric information (AI) phenomenon. The aim of this 
study is to perform an analysis of the determining factors in the adoption of relational contracting (RC) in combination 
with Building Information Modelling (BIM) to reduce AI. The results of a questionnaire survey, which was e-mailed to 
14 specialists with solid experience (over twenty years) and knowledge in construction projects, revealed that the prob-
ability of the AI phenomenon occurring in Portugal is very high, and its impact on construction projects is equally high. 
The results also show that RC in combination with the BIM methodology contributes very positively to the mitigation of 
AI problems in construction projects in Portugal. Approximately 85% of respondents consider that the government should 
seek to reduce AI in the public works sector through the use of RC and its combination with the BIM methodology in the 
Portuguese Public Contracts Code. 
Keywords: BIM, construction projects, relational contracting, asymmetric information, Portugal.
Introduction
Some authors explain project management (PM) as a 
methodology based on applying knowledge, skills, tools, 
and techniques to project activities in response to their 
specific requirements. In brief, each activity receives an 
input, adds value to it, uses the organization’s resources 
and produces an output to generate a specific result 
(Dumouchel et  al., 2004; Morais et  al., 2015; Project 
Management Institute [PMI], 1996, 2018). However, the 
vulnerability of construction projects often means many 
activities that imply distinct categories of knowledge. For 
example, most construction projects are subject to climate 
specificities and this only factor may involve uncertainties 
associated with the duration and productivity of activities 
in construction projects and can therefore hinder their 
success (Acıkara et al., 2017).
Xiang et al. (2015) considers that PM in the construc-
tion sector is a complex and uncertain process: for exam-
ple, when procuring a service or ordering a material, there 
is a tendency to use the same contracting methodology 
regardless of the project’s specific requirements. Ning and 
Ling (2015) point out that companies, when procuring 
services and materials, always seek the lowest price, thus 
increasing the inefficiency of the sector and giving rise 
to criticisms associated with a low level of productivity 
and innovation. Some authors suggest that the main cause 
of these problems in the sector stems from the fact that 
contractors do not share the necessary information with 
the contracting parties regarding the construction project, 
thus preventing both parties from getting involved in an 
integrated manner and developing a close relationship 
(Ling et al., 2014; Xiang et al., 2015).
From the perspective of the economy, restriction on 
access to information gives rise to the so-called asymmet-
ric information (AI) phenomenon. This asymmetry oc-
curs when two or more economic agents establish a trans-
action between themselves and one of the parties holds 
more information than the other (Arrow, 1978; Xiang 
et al., 2015). It was Arrow (1978) who first presented this 
concept in 1963, suggesting that, in the context of eco-
nomic activities, the parties may deliberately hide part of 
the information in order to protect their own interests. 
But in 1970 Akerlof introduced and analysed the impact 
218 A. Marinho et al. Relational contracting and its combination with the BIM methodology in mitigating ...
of AI in the market failure problem (Akerlof, 1970). Later, 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) addressed the role of AI in 
the context of job market and insurance, showing that 
agents can send signals to mitigate the effect of informa-
tional asymmetry (Spender, 1993). The basic idea is that 
agents trade in the market because they share mutual ben-
efits. However, when the AI increases up to a certain level, 
high-quality goods drop out from the market and only 
low-quality goods can be traded. This situation is called 
adverse selection (Biglaiser & Friedman, 1999; Bloodgood 
& Salisbury, 2001; Tilles et al., 2011). The complexity of 
both the market and human behaviour makes it difficult 
to build mathematical models able to be applied in real-
world situations. The challenge consists in incorporating 
AI into mainstream of the standard economic theory. To 
solve the this problem, Ling and Tran (2012) consider that 
the use of relational contracting (RC) as a procurement 
method is beneficial because it produces better results due 
to greater involvement of the contractor in the project. 
The concept of RC was identified by Sanders and Moore 
(1992), who categorized two types of contracts based on 
the procurement of services or materials: individual con-
tracting (IC) and RC. In IC, stakeholders usually proceed 
independently, focusing on their own interests; in turn, 
RC is underpinned by different approaches that establish 
working relationships between the contractor and the 
contracting party and thus promotes win-win situations. 
However, in recent years there have been developments 
and adaptations of collaborative tools and methodologies 
in the construction sector. For example, the Building In-
formation Modeling (BIM) methodology, or simply BIM, 
described as a socio-technical system (Sackey et al., 2015) 
(as it is composed of technical dimensions such as 3D 
modelling, planning and cost), has led to changes in the 
way designers and builders share information (Liu et al., 
2017). 
The aim of this study is to conduct an analysis of the 
characteristics of RC and its relevance in combination 
with the BIM methodology in construction projects to re-
duce AI. The following research questions were identified: 
Q1 – “How does RC positively affect the reduction of AI in 
public works construction projects? What are the main char-
acteristics of RC?”; Q2 – “How does RC in combination with 
BIM positively affect the reduction of AI in public works 
construction projects? What are the main characteristics of 
RC in combination with BIM?”; Q3 – “Does the Portuguese 
legislation provide for the reduction of AI in public works 
construction projects?”.
Through a literature review, several characteristics of 
RC and its combination with the BIM methodology were 
collected. To understand the experts’ perception of the im-
portance of RC and its combination with the BIM meth-
odology on mitigating AI in construction projects in Por-
tugal, surveys were developed and implemented via the 
Internet. In the selection of the population, we took into 
consideration the technicians with expertise in construc-
tion direction and management that have participated in 
BIM methodology-based RC projects from the 50 largest 
companies in the building construction and built herit-
age sector in Portugal according to PORDATA, the Por-
tuguese Database with the major companies in Portugal, 
resulting into 14 specialists.
The subsequent sections are organized as follows: Sec-
tion 1 describes the review of the state of the art; Section 2 
presents the research methodology implemented in this 
study; Section 3 presents and discusses the results ob-
tained; finally, last Section presents the main conclusions 
of the work conducted within this study.
1. Literature review
1.1. Characteristics of asymmetric information 
In general, one can say that uncertainty is the main ele-
ment that complicates construction projects, as it creates 
a need for adaptation in situations characterized by in-
complete and asymmetric information (Wang et al., 2017; 
You et al., 2018) and may even give rise to opportunistic 
behaviour on the part of the contractor in order to achieve 
his own gains at the expense of the contracting party. For 
example, You et al. (2018) state that uncertainty subjects 
trade to opportunistic behaviour that can be avoided by 
implementing RC. In recent years, the uncertainty fac-
tor in construction projects has led researchers to deepen 
the impact of AI in the construction sector (Xiang et al., 
2015).
The asymmetric influence is defined through mor-
al hazard or adverse selection (You et  al., 2018). Moral 
hazard exists when an agent is exposed to unpredictable 
events that may affect his performance and induce him to 
make less effort – because there is an incentive to make 
less effort – and to blame his failure on the unpredictable 
event and not on his own lack of effort (Xiang et al., 2015; 
You et al., 2018). There is adverse selection when you can-
not distinguish good products (or good workers, or more 
careful customers) from bad products (or bad workers, or 
less careful customers). A major difference that should be 
noted is that moral hazard arises “after the contract” and 
adverse selection “before the contract”. Moral hazard can 
also be viewed as an incompletely specified contract that 
does not cover all types of behaviour. In this regard, moral 
hazard in RC can be viewed as an incompletely specified 
contract. For example, customers may determine a base 
price for the bid that is reasonable in order to eliminate 
malicious bids and choose the one with the most advanta-
geous price-quality (Xiang et al., 2012).
The existence of private information makes the dis-
tribution of AI among the entities, therefore our study 
relates to literature on the principal-agent theory, which 
is usually used in the design of incentive mechanisms (Su 
et al., 2020). According to Bovens et al. (2014) the princi-
pal-agent theory encapsulates a rational choice modelling 
where the principal uses whatever actions to provide in-
centives for the agent to make decisions that the principal 
most prefers. Laffont and Martimort (2009) proposed the 
theory of incentive based on the principal-agent frame-
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work, and stated that the need for proper incentive mech-
anisms appears when the principal hires an agent who has 
superior information. By testing principal-agent theory in 
buyer–supplier relationships, Su et al. (2020) found that 
both ex ante and ex post forms of opportunism can ex-
plain the occurrence of moral hazard. 
Chang and Shen (2014) points out that to control the 
probability of AI occurring, the project owner can promote 
a collaborative bidding process, i.e., he can provide a fair-
trading platform and thus strengthen the dissemination 
of information and knowledge. On the other hand, more 
emphasis should be placed on relational approaches in the 
execution phase to prevent contractors from incurring in 
“moral corruption” even when they seek to maximize their 
profits (Xiang et  al., 2012). The relational approach has 
been explored in the literature of organizational studies 
from a predominantly functional perspective and much 
of the research emphasizes its potential benefits and pur-
poses (Hardy & Phillips, 1998) when it involves sharing 
information in decision-making and sharing data and re-
sources (Popp et al., 2004).
1.2. Relevance of relational contracting  
in reducing asymmetric information
Walker and Lloyd Walker (2015) group in three main cate-
gories the most commonly used contractual arrangements 
in the construction sector: (i) separation of design from 
construction responsibilities: Design-Bid-Build (DBB), 
which is the best-known model – it separates design from 
build and has the advantage of not entailing the risk of 
coordination for the client, but still the contractor does 
not add knowledge in the design phase (Chappell & Par-
kin, 2004; Ribeiro, 2012); (ii) project delivery with a focus 
on planning and control: Design-Build (DB) and Public-
Private Partnerships (PPP), two models characterized by 
the fact that there is only one organization responsible for 
design and build, although the client has no control over 
the construction project (Chappell & Parkin, 2004; Healy, 
2007); (iii) delivery of the integrated project – Integrated 
Project Delivery (IPD), focused on collaboration, part-
nerships, coalitions and RC. The project owner delegates 
control of the project and acts in collaboration with the 
various stakeholders, and the contractor adds knowledge 
in the design phase (Hosseini et al., 2017).
According to Liu et  al. (2017), the most commonly 
used contracts in the construction sector are the DBB 
type, which can give rise to AI (adverse selection) between 
the contractor and the contracting party and therefore 
cause the information holder to behave opportunistically 
when approaching the other party. On the other hand, as 
the contracting parties are less experienced, a more in-
formed and experienced supplier or contractor may tend 
to adopt opportunistic behaviour. Hence the importance 
of RC, as it allows for information transfer, knowledge 
creation, technological coordination, and resource allo-
cation in order to operate effectively and thus minimize 
potential conflicts in the implementation of construction 
projects. Therefore, it is important to establish effective 
management mechanisms, such as RC, to reduce potential 
opportunistic behaviours, both on the part of the contrac-
tor and the contracting party (Yiu et al., 2018).
The IPD method began to be implemented in prac-
tice when in 2007 the American Institute of Architects 
(AIA) introduced this new system of project delivery that 
promotes a more efficient performance via a greater in-
tegration of the various stakeholders (Mesa et al., 2016). 
The IPD consists of an alternative and highly collabora-
tive contractual agreement (American Institute of Archi-
tects & Associated General Contractors of America, 2004; 
Kent & Becerik-Gerber, 2010; Mihic et al., 2014) between 
at least three main parties involved in the project: the cli-
ent, the designer, and the contractor; it requires the use of 
the BIM methodology and the integration of technology 
in the contract (Mihic et al., 2014; Raisbeck et al., 2010); 
it promotes high performance of the teams involved by 
aligning incentives and goals; and increases the construc-
tion project’s final value to the client by reducing waste 
and promoting the relationship between the stakehold-
ers (Kent & Becerik-Gerber, 2010; Raisbeck et al., 2010). 
While the IPD may have advantages over other procure-
ment methods regarding certain types or dimensions of 
construction projects, the literature suggests, however, 
that it may produce disadvantageous results in less com-
plex and smaller projects (Mesa et al., 2016). Lévy (2011) 
states that a major factor for the success of the IPD is open 
and honest communication between stakeholders, which 
results in increased value for the customer and reduced 
construction waste. In other words, lower information 
and transactions costs increase alignment of incentives 
and increase efficiency in that at least one-party benefits 
(namely, in terms of lower costs) and the other party loses. 
Some authors consider nine fundamental principles to 
obtain the maximum benefits from the IPD (American In-
stitute of Architects & Associated General Contractors of 
America, 2004; Kent & Becerik-Gerber, 2010; Mihic et al., 
2014): 1) a multi-party agreement; 2) mutual respect and 
trust; 3) mutual benefits and rewards; 4) collaborative in-
novation and joint decision-making; 5) initial involvement 
of key stakeholders; 6) setting goals at the beginning of the 
project; 7) intensified planning; 8) open communication; 
and 9) effective organization and leadership in construc-
tion project management.
The IPD involves transactional contracts and relational 
contracts. Externally, stakeholders enter a classic transac-
tional contract with the client and some suppliers, and in-
ternally they are bound by a relational contract described 
in the procurement document signed by all parties. The 
relational contract minimizes the cost of the transaction 
by uniting the stakeholders in a partnership for the dura-
tion of the project. In other words, the IPD is a RC ap-
proach that aligns the project goals with the stakeholders’ 
interests (Matthews & Howell, 2005). Relational contract-
ing is relevant to the IPD methodology because chang-
ing assumptions about the stakeholders’ behaviours and 
motivations allows envisaging and addressing many of 
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the problems associated with public-private supply (Hrelja 
et al., 2018). Piroozfar et al. (2019) also point out that col-
laboration and trust are the most important factors of the 
IPD methodology in the project’s initial stage. The absence 
of these two factors is identified in the literature as the 
main barrier to implementing the IPD methodology. As 
a non-pecuniary instrument, moral appeals are outside 
standard economic cost-benefit analysis. Their monetary 
costs are typically small, they are fast to implement, and 
they can complement economic incentives or command-
and-control regulations. By affecting social norms or the 
adherence to norms (Acıkara et al., 2017; Young, 2015), 
moral suasion is expected to increase individual contribu-
tions to reduce externalities or to contribute to a public 
good in absence of more rigorous governmental inter-
ventions and may also increase support for and compli-
ance with regulations. Young (2015) also refers that social 
norms are patterns of behaviour that are self-enforcing 
within a group: Everyone conforms, everyone is expected 
to conform, and everyone wants to conform when they 
expect everyone else to conform.
According to Gu and London (2010), RC is similar 
to partnerships and coalitions because a temporary or-
ganization is created from individual entities, but differs 
in its approach by way of compensation, risk sharing and 
decision-making by both parties. In RC, both parties may 
agree to limit liability between them because if they make 
mistakes the insurance is expected to respond. But what 
happens if the insurance contract is not fully specified, 
so that all contingencies are not covered? Also, are there 
deductibles of some sort in the insurance contract, or RC 
for that matter, to address the moral hazard problem? 
Decisions are developed as a team, but the project owner 
usually holds the final decision rights in the absence of 
team consensus. As discussed by Halttula et  al. (2015), 
traditional methods prove ineffective and impose on the 
construction industry the need to use other methods, such 
as RC, to establish a mutual goal. For these authors, the 
main characteristic of RC is the distribution of the pro-
ject’s responsibilities and risks, which corroborates the 
interpretation by Gu and London (2010). Shared values, 
restricted participation, meetings and collective sanctions 
help companies to demonstrate their commitment to the 
projects and disseminate information among all stake-
holders (Grafton & Mundy, 2017). Traditional contracts 
are exposed to moral hazards and AI problems (Alon 
et al., 2015; Hart, 2017) that can create difficulties to the 
construction industry. On occasions, it is difficult to verify 
contract performance based on its original provisions, and 
parties in a long-term relationship may rely on incentives 
contracts that are self-enforced or relational (Doornik, 
2006). Due to the internal and external dynamics of this 
economic relationship, it is important that parties have 
room to re-negotiate. Relational contracting theory is well 
suited to underpin the behaviour between both parts as 
they look to find equilibrium over their governance and 
performance. RC are more fit to govern trust and commit-
ment-based relationship in construction partnerships, and 
to help construction partnerships be more efficient and 
stable, which can lead to international franchise expansion 
and group performance.
Musawir et al. (2020) conducted a systematic review 
of the literature on project governance and its role in stra-
tegic organizational implementation and found that most 
quantitative research remains focused on contractual and 
relational governance. For their part, Herz et  al. (2019) 
conducted a study on the factors of cooperation and mis-
trust in relational contracts and verified that labour and 
commercial relations are often governed by relational 
contracts, in which the incentives for cooperation derive 
from the future benefits expected from this relationship. 
By comparing the relationship between the contractor and 
the contracting party with verifiable and non-verifiable 
information about the contractor’s costs, they found that 
non-verifiable information affects the terms of the rela-
tional contracts; however, the party that is negatively af-
fected by these adjustments does not originate a reduction 
of efficiency.
In a study conducted by Hosseini et  al. (2017) are 
mentioned the four main characteristics of relational con-
tracts in the construction sector: (i) common incentives; 
(ii) involvement of the contractor from the initial stage; 
(iii) cooperation between the parties involved; and (iv) its 
significant importance in complex projects. These authors 
also stress that the main reasons for clients to choose RC 
are, firstly, to improve the attitude of project participants 
and reduce the occurrence of disputes, changes in scope, 
rework, and possible incidents; and, secondly, the change, 
complexity of projects and uncertainty in projects. 
The more uncertainty in the projects, the greater the 
possibility of AI, especially moral hazard from incomplete-
ly specified contracts, including insurance, more disputes 
and scope changes, but relational contracts can foster a 
collaborative environment and establish a common pur-
pose for all project stakeholders. Rahman and Kumaras-
wamy (2002) argue that the appropriate contracting meth-
od, based on clear and equitable contractual documents, 
does not guarantee the success of a project, because the 
attitudes of the contracting parties and the relationships 
between project participants are equally important. An-
other stream of research tries to find out whether intrinsic 
or extrinsic motivation is the cause of behaviour. Gneezy 
et al. (2011) examined the importance and effectiveness of 
external incentives to induce a certain behaviour. Not only 
may offering a positive incentive shift the review-writing 
decision from social to monetary, but it may also break 
social norms of trust as the explicit incentive can signal a 
marketer’s attempt to manipulate prosocial customer be-
haviour. Schmidt and Wagner (2019) stress that RC can 
be useful in reducing information costs (defined as costs 
of negotiating, writing and ensuring compliance with a 
contract), in promoting corporate relationships and more 
efficient teamwork.
Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of RC, 
found in the literature review, which contribute to reduc-
ing asymmetric information in construction projects.
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1.3. Relational contracting in combination  
with the BIM methodology in reducing  
asymmetric information
BIM is a methodology with its own characteristics that 
affect project procedures (Halttula et  al., 2015). The 
main function of the BIM methodology is to enable us-
ers to integrate, analyse, simulate and visualize a build-
ing’s geometric or non-geometric information (Grilo & 
Jardim-Goncalves, 2010), and has been recognized as one 
of the most appropriate platforms for the Architecture, 
Engineering and Construction (AEC) industry (Li et al., 
2017) by promoting the integration of stakeholders and 
correcting problems that occur in the flow of data and 
information (Nathan & Scobell, 2012; Succar, 2009). The 
BIM have an impact on the consumption of building en-
ergy, by optimized building design and construction and 
operating management. For example, BIM contribute to a 
successful integration of photovoltaic technologies (build-
ing integrated photovoltaic and building attached/applied 
photovoltaic) which generates benign energy by harness-
ing abundant, inexhaustible, clean solar power (Ghosh, 
2020). The BIM methodology is the current expression 
of digital innovation in the construction sector (Succar & 
Kassem, 2015). 
Communication between project stakeholders has 
also been altered by the introduction of the BIM meth-
odology in the construction sector to facilitate the shar-
ing of information, knowledge and technology among 
the various stakeholders throughout a project’s life cycle 
(Holmström et al., 2015). Although construction projects 
are heavily dependent on the knowledge that each of the 
various stakeholders contributes to successful delivery 
and decision-making (Mok & Shen, 2016), there is still 
a lack of efficient guidelines for collaboration among the 
various specialties in all the project’s stages (Kurwi et al., 
2017). Therefore, the challenge is to develop a collabora-
tion model to improve communication among the various 
stakeholders and thus promote greater adoption of BIM in 
the construction sector (Wang et al., 2020).
The IPD is a project delivery approach interconnected 
with BIM (Piroozfar et al., 2019). The BIM methodology is 
advocated in many scientific articles (Azhar, 2011; Azhar 
et al., 2012) due to the main fact of improving commu-
nication among stakeholders. The IPD was introduced in 
the United States (Mihic et al., 2014) to establish in the 
construction sector a different paradigm than traditional 
procurement systems, aiming to reducing project’s cost, 
duration, and quality. According to the American Institute 
of Architects (AIA), although BIM can be implemented 
in most procurement systems, this methodology is more 
appropriate when implemented within the framework of 
IPD, as the combination of the two methodologies favours 
the transition from the traditional paradigm to the mod-
ern paradigm.
In recent years there have been some developments 
that highlight the use of the BIM methodology as a col-
laborative tool (Liu et al., 2017) to create an information 
centre for the life cycle of projects (Mihic et  al., 2014), 
where stakeholders add information or knowledge to the 
model (Hrelja et al., 2018), from which all the necessary 
documents are then extracted of focal points, including 
the impact upon information and transactions costs, for 
example, game theory is often used to study the relation-
ship among engineering project stakeholders and resolve 
conflicts (Rzepecki, 2021). The review of modern appli-
cation of a game theory has shown the wide spectrum 
Table 1. Main characteristics of RC that contribute to reducing AI
Characteristics of RC Authors
Transfer of information in the initial phase of the project Liu et al. (2017)
Creation of knowledge in the initial phase of the project Liu et al. (2017)
Reduction of conflicts between the parties involved Liu et al. (2017)
Technological coordination between the parties involved Liu et al. (2017)
Allocation of resources to operate effectively Liu et al. (2017)
Risk sharing between the parties involved Gu and London (2010), Halttula et al. (2015)
Distribution of responsibilities and risks between the parties involved Halttula et al. (2015), Hosseini et al. (2017)
Future relations between the parties involved Halttula et al. (2015), Hosseini et al. (2017)
Common incentives between the parties involved Grafton and Mundy (2017), Hosseini et al. (2017)
Involvement of the contractor in the initial phase of the project Grafton and Mundy (2017), Hosseini et al. (2017)
Cooperation between the parties involved Hosseini et al. (2017)
Its relevance in complex projects Hosseini et al. (2017)
Improving the attitude of project participants Hosseini et al. (2017), Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2002)
Reduction of disputes between the parties involved Hosseini et al. (2017), Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2002)
Reduction of unnecessary work Hosseini et al. (2017), Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2002)
Promotion of teamwork Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2002)
Reduce of transactions and information costs Fanning et al. (2015)
Intrinsic or extrinsic motivation Gneezy et al. (2011)
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of its use supporting decision making. Models based on 
the game theory were applied for renewal of construction 
objects, analysis of bidding procedure and profit distri-
bution in construction projects and the need to support 
the negotiation processes in a construction industry was 
recognized (Anysz, 2019; Rzepecki, 2021).
Therefore, the interdependence between all the par-
ticipants in the sector is extended and direct, starting with 
the project and then with planning/management, con-
struction, and maintenance (Piroozfar et al., 2019). IPD, 
thought a relatively new and still evolving project deliv-
ery system, emphasises on the involvement of key partici-
pants, relationships, collaboration and the pursuit of mu-
tual goals (Hamidavi et al., 2020). Nevertheless, evidence 
shows that few projects adopt IPD, due cultural, financial, 
legal and technological barriers (Teng et al., 2017). One of 
the keys to IPD success includes mutual profit and reward 
that motivates stakeholders. Studies have been conducted 
in the field of fair distribution of profits, and IPD has been 
more successful in this regard (Li et al., 2017; Teng et al., 
2017). 
BIM distinguished from other methods by integrating 
all those involved in the design of the architectural project 
and specialties, and therefore adding value to the project. 
BIM is used in combination with the other methodologies, 
but is highly recommended, and deeply advantageous, 
when combined with the IPD (Marinho, 2014; Ribeiro, 
2012). The IPD reduces the barriers regarding in the im-
plementation of BIM, because it removes the contractual 
and responsibility separations and consequently favours 
the collaboration environment necessary for the effective 
implementation of BIM (Azhar et al., 2012). According to 
Jones (2014), the combination of the IPD with the BIM 
methodology allows optimizing the construction project 
in terms of sustainability – and this explains why BIM is 
considered an essential tool for the construction sector. 
BIM is also important for the IPD, as it provides a three-
dimensional model of the project before its construction, 
allowing stakeholders to clearly analyse the project (Lévy, 
2011; Mihic et al., 2014).
Fanning et  al. (2015) found that BIM promotes the 
process of interdisciplinary cooperation and communica-
tion in a construction project and contributes to the re-
duction of errors through knowledge sharing. Kurwi et al. 
(2017) noted that collaboration can enhance productivity, 
as cooperation between multidisciplinary teams contrib-
utes to the reduction of project errors.
The greatest advantage of using RC in combination 
with the BIM methodology is the reduction of conflicts 
between the various stakeholders throughout the life cy-
cle of construction projects. Projects using RC require 
the designer and the contractor to work together in the 
initial phase. Thus, the BIM methodology can be the link 
that enables this integration between project stakehold-
ers, therefore promoting effective and fluid communica-
tion between the various parties involved (Halttula et al., 
2015).
However, several professional entities have started to 
develop addenda to their contracts and to define the re-
sponsibilities of the teams using the BIM methodology. 
These addenda allow clients, architects, engineers, and 
builders to obtain a guide to develop a specific project 
using the BIM methodology. As an example, in 2008 the 
American Institute of Architects (AIA) and the Associated 
General Contractors of America (AGCA) created the first 
addendum, called E202 (Hardin & McCool, 2015). Kent 
and Becerik-Gerber (2010) show that the experience of 
construction professionals has been optimized by using 
RC in combination with the BIM methodology or exclu-
sively with RC in their construction projects. Although 
it may seem that the BIM methodology is used more in 
RC-based contracts, the industry professionals emphasize 
that BIM is not a prerequisite for RC. The same authors 
(Kent & Becerik-Gerber, 2010) also stress that there are 
still cultural, social norms, procedural and organizational 
barriers to the widespread use of RC in the construction 
sector. Through interviews with a group of experts in the 
use of the BIM methodology, Liu et al. (2017) identified 
eight characteristics that influence the development of the 
collaborative process using the BIM methodology: (i) in-
formation technology capability; (ii) technology manage-
ment; (iii) attitude and behaviour; (iv) roles and responsi-
bilities; (v) trust; (vi) communication; (vii) leadership; and 
(viii) learning and experience. 
Table 2 summarizes the main characteristics of RC in 
combination with the BIM methodology, identified in the 
literature review, which contribute to reduce AI in con-
struction projects.
Table 2. Main characteristics of RC in combination with the BIM methodology in reducing AI
Characteristics of RC in combination with the BIM methodology Authors
Corrects problems in data flow Nathan and Scobell (2012), Succar (2009)
Facilitates adding information to the model Arayici et al. (2009), Halttula et al. (2015)
Interdependence between all project participants Addor et al. (2010)
Integrated activities with a single and mutual goal Li et al. (2017), Halttula et al. (2015), Liu et al. (2017)
Involvement of designers and contractor to increase value for the client Halttula et al. (2015), Liu et al. (2017),  
Hardin and McCool (2015)
Increased communication between the parties involved Liu et al. (2017), Hardin and McCool (2015)
Definition of roles and responsibilities Liu et al. (2017)
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1.4. European and national legislation on the use  
of collaborative systems in combination with BIM
The use of the BIM methodology is much diversified at in-
ternational level. The Nordic countries were the most ad-
vanced at an early stage, followed by the UK and Ireland, 
but there is now a general willingness to implement the 
BIM methodology worldwide through a series of public 
policies aimed at improving the efficiency of the construc-
tion industry (Charef et al., 2018). At the European level, 
Directive 2014/24/EU (2014) of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on public procurement establishes the 
need to use the BIM methodology for construction pro-
jects financed by public funds (Charef et al., 2018).
The implementation of the BIM methodology pro-
vided for in Directive 2014/24/EU (2014) has the specific 
goal of assessing and overcoming legal, regulatory, politi-
cal and public procurement barriers in order to promote 
collaborative work and data sharing (EuBIM TaskGroup, 
2017) and introduce major changes in business and PM 
practices (He et al., 2017). In 2017, the European Union 
released a manual, prepared with the collaboration of 21 
countries, on the application of the BIM methodology in 
the public sector in order to make construction costs low-
er and more rigorous and reduce delays in the execution 
of construction projects. As such, governments, being the 
largest contracting entities, can influence and encourage 
innovation regarding procurement procedures (EuBIM 
TaskGroup, 2017).
The Portuguese Public Contracts Code (PCC) is based 
on the ninth amendment through Decree-Law 111-B/2017 
which transposes the abovementioned Directive 2014/24/
EU (2014) and provides for the possibility of using the 
BIM methodology or other electronic means of modelling 
construction data. However, this law is silent on its speci-
ficity or the procedure for its adoption and implementa-
tion. Regarding procurement criteria, the best price-qual-
ity ratio is assessed through a cost-effectiveness analysis, 
including life cycle costs. The legislation also provides for 
the introduction of a designated contract manager whose 
function is to permanently monitor the execution of the 
construction project (SPMS, 2017).
2. Research methodology
Comprehensive research was carried out through the anal-
ysis of journal and conference papers mainly published 
between 2013 and 2018, related to RC, the BIM meth-
odology and reduction of information asymmetry in the 
construction sector, but older papers were also analysed 
due to their important contribution. This research used 
Science Direct database based on the following keywords 
in different combinations: “asymmetric information”, “re-
lational contracting”, “BIM”, and “construction projects”. 
Based on the literature review, the main characteristics of 
relational contracting (RC) and the advantages of its com-
bination with the BIM methodology for reducing asym-
metric information were identified. 
To understand the experts’ perception of the impor-
tance of RC and its combination with the BIM methodol-
ogy in mitigating AI in construction projects in Portugal, 
surveys were developed and sent via an explanatory e-mail 
that presented the issue and made the recipients aware of 
the importance of their collaboration in this study. We 
tried to captivate the interest of these specialists in the 
subject and guaranteed them confidentiality of all data 
provided, which would only be used for statistical treat-
ment and analysis. 
In the selection of the population, it was taking into 
consideration the technicians with expertise in construc-
tion direction and management registered with the Por-
tuguese Engineers Order that have participated in BIM 
based RC projects, and the 50 largest companies in the 
building construction and built heritage sector in Por-
tugal according to PORDATA, the Portuguese Database 
with the major companies in Portugal resulting into 14 
specialists. Although the sample (14 specialists) is small, it 
is representative of the Portuguese context, given its char-
acteristics, size and criteria established for the selection.
The survey developed in the research study was divid-
ed into four distinct sections. Section I addressed the is-
sue of AI and its impact on construction projects. Section 
II and Section III presented tables containing a range of 
factors carefully selected through a previous bibliograph-
ic compilation aimed at identifying the most important 
characteristics of RC (Section 1.2, Table 1) and its combi-
nation with the BIM methodology (Section 1.3, Table 2) 
in reducing AI. In Section IV respondents were asked to 
answer the following question: “Does national legislation 
provide for the reduction of AI? Would it be important to 
consider the use of RC or BIM? Why?”.
In Section II and Section III respondents were asked 
to classify a set of characteristics using a Likert scale, rated 
from 1 to 4, where 1 corresponded to “unimportant” and 4 
to “very important” (Norman, 2010). After collecting the 
answers, we adopted the relative importance index (RII) 
determined for each item and defined by Eqn (1): 
1
.










where: x – total number of survey responses (14); j – num-
ber of levels defined as valid response options (4 in this 
case); ai – constant expressing the weight assigned to each 
response option (0 ≤ ai ≤ 1); ni – variable expressing the 
frequency of selection of response i. The RII value ranges 
from 0 to 1, with a high RII showing a good correlation 
between the respondents’ answers for each item.
To evaluate the internal consistency of the question-
naire, an analysis was performed using the Cronbach’s 
alpha value to quantify the internal consistency of the 
items within each question. The Cronbach’s alpha value 
can vary between 0 and 1, so the higher the value between 
the items in the category, the higher the consistency, since 
this value measures the correlation between the answers 
to the questionnaire and presents the average correlation 
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between the questions, which is calculated from the vari-
ance of the individual items and the variance of the sum 
of the items of each respondent in relation to all the items 
of each question in the questionnaire. This means that a 
respondent who has chosen a Likert value for a particu-
lar item tends to choose a similar numerical value for the 
other items. According to DeVellis (2003), a Cronbach’s al-
pha value between 0.70 and 0.95 indicates a high internal 
consistency among all items; conversely, a Cronbach’s al-
pha less than 0.70 presents a weak interrelationship among 
items (Tonglet et al., 2004).
3. Analysis and discussion of results
It was possible to obtain and validate all the answers from 
the 14 experts surveyed. Based on these answers, 78.6% 
of these experts have more than 25 years of professional 
experience, and 21.4% have between 20 and 25 years of 
experience, and therefore all of them have experience in 
the public works sector in Portugal. 
All the results obtained from the respondents’ answers 
are explained and analysed below.
3.1. Section I – Asymmetric information
Section I was intended to obtain the respondents’ assess-
ment on the probability of AI occurring in construction 
projects and its impact using a scale from 1 to 5, where 
1 corresponded to “very low probability” and 5 to “very 
high probability”. 
Table 3 shows the results from the analysis of the col-
lected data, based on the percentage calculated from the 
responses obtained. It can be observed that 64.3% of the 
respondents consider that AI can occur in construction 
projects in Portugal. Regarding the impact of AI, 57.1% of 
the respondents also consider it to be very high, which, as 
evidenced in the literature review, gives rise to a less effi-
cient sector and a low level of productivity and innovation. 
3.2. Section II – Relational contracting as a method 
for reducing asymmetric information
A correlation analysis in this section intended to ob-
tain from respondents the predominant characteristics 
of RC that contributed to reducing AI. This section also 
sought to answer research question Q1 identified in the 
Introduction: “Does RC positively affect the reduction of 
AI in public works construction projects? What are the 
main characteristics of RC?”. 
Table 4 lists the sixteen characteristics (A1 to A16) 
found in the literature review (Section 1.2, Table 1), the 
corresponding RII values, Pearson’s correlation and Cron-
bach’s alpha.
The global Cronbach’s alpha resulting from the analysis 
of the data collected from the general sample corresponds 
to 0.77 (above 0.75), which reveals a high internal consist-
ency and therefore shows a good correlation between the 
respondents’ answers. The individual values (by charac-
teristic) of Cronbach’s alpha shown in Table 4 suggest that 
each item contributes positively to internal consistency, as 
explained in Section 3.
Table 4. Main characteristics of RC that contribute to reducing AI (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7739)
Characteristics of RC RII Pearson’s correlation Cronbach’s alpha
A1 – Information transfer in the project’s initial phase 89% 0.9393 0.7868
A2 – Knowledge creation in the project’s initial phase 82% 0.7683 0.7751
A3 – Reduction of conflicts between the parties involved 86% 0.9827 0.7337
A4 – Technological coordination between the parties involved 80% 0.6389 0.7690
A5 – Allocation of resources for effectively operating 88% 0.8944 0.7537
A6 – Risk sharing between the parties involved 80% 0.6389 0.7890
A7 – Distribution of responsibilities and risks 88% 0.8944 0.7401
A8 – Future relations between the parties involved 75% 0.7182 0.7228
A9 – Common incentives between the parties involved 71% 0.2863 0.7746
A10 – Involvement of the contractor in the project’s initial phase 75% 0.7593 0.7940
A11 – Cooperation between the parties involved 89% 0.9393 0.7594
A12 – Its importance in complex projects 93% 0.9288 0.7481
A13 – Improving the attitude of project participants 91% 0.9478 0.7463
A14 – Reduction of disputes between the parties involved 79% 0.5153 0.7465
A15 – Decrease in scope and rework 80% 0.8305 0.7258
A16 – Increase in teamwork 89% 0.9393 0.8025
Table 3. Overall result of the research on the probability of AI 
occurring in construction projects and its impact 
Scale Probability of occurrence (%) Impact (%)




Very high 64.3% 57.1%
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The linear relationship between the characteristics of 
RC and Pearson’s correlation shows a strong relationship 
between the variables, with the exception of characteris-
tics A4 (Technological coordination between the parties 
involved), A6 (Risk sharing between the parties involved) 
and A14 (Reduction of disputes between the parties in-
volved), which present values between 0.5 and 0.70 and 
therefore indicate a moderate correlation; and with the ex-
ception of characteristic A9 (Common incentives between 
the parties involved), which presents a value lower than 
0.30 and therefore shows a weak correlation. This shows 
that respondents were more likely to assign inconsistent 
scores (according to Likert’s scale) to characteristic A9.
Characteristic A9 also had a relatively low RII score, 
thus conveying some uncertainty in the respondents’ re-
sponse to the remaining characteristics. The best rated 
item is A12 (Its importance in complex projects), with a 
RII of 93%, followed by A13 (Improving the attitude of 
project participants), with a RII of 91%.
The analysis of the results shows that all respondents 
consider that the main characteristics of relational con-
tracting positively affect the reduction of AI, with a RII 
of over 70%. However, as a criterion of relevance, the five 
best-rated characteristics in reducing AI were the follow-
ing: (i) Its importance in complex projects; (ii) Improving 
the attitude of project participants; (iii) Cooperation be-
tween the parties involved; (iv) Increased teamwork; and 
(v) Transfer of information in the project’s initial phase.
3.3. Section III – Relational contracting in 
combination with the BIM methodology in 
reducing asymmetric information
A correlation analysis in Section III of the survey intend-
ed to find out from respondents which were the main 
characteristics of RC that, in combination with the BIM 
methodology, contribute to reducing IA. This section also 
sought to answer research question Q2 identified in the 
Introduction: “Does RC associated with BIM positively 
affect the reduction of AI in public works construction 
projects? What are the main characteristics of RC associ-
ated with BIM?”. 
Table 5 presents the seven characteristics (B1 to B7) 
identified in the literature review (Section 1.3, Table 2), 
the corresponding RII values, Pearson’s correlation, and 
Cronbach’s alpha.
The global Cronbach’s alpha resulting from the analy-
sis of the data collected from the general sample corre-
sponds to 0.7818 (above 0.75), which reveals a high inter-
nal consistency and therefore indicates a good correlation 
between the respondent’s answers. The individual values 
(by characteristic) of Cronbach’s alpha shown in Table 5 
suggest that each item contributes positively to internal 
consistency, as explained in Section 3, and also indicate as 
a strong relationship between all characteristics.
From the analysis of the results obtained, it is clear 
that all respondents consider that the main characteris-
tics of RC in combination with the BIM methodology 
positively affect the reduction of AI, with a RII of over 
84%. However, as a criterion of relevance, the five best-
rated characteristics in reducing AI were the following: 
(i) Facilitates adding information to the model; (ii) Inter-
dependence among all project participants; (iii) Integrated 
activities with a single and mutual goal; (iv) Definition of 
roles and responsibilities; and (v) Increased communica-
tion between the parties involved.
3.4. Section IV – National legislation  
on the use of collaborative systems
Section IV of the survey intended to obtain respondents’ 
opinion on the following question: “Should national leg-
islation consider the use of the RC or the BIM methodol-
ogy? Why?”. This section also sought to answer research 
question Q3 identified in the Introduction: “Does the 
Portuguese legislation provide for the reduction of AI in 
public works construction projects?”.
Respondents consider that the public procurement 
legislation does not provide for the reduction of AI and 
that it would be important to use RC in the Portuguese 
Public Contracts Code (PCC), particularly in manage-
ment and division of responsibilities. 
As to the introduction of the BIM methodology and 
RC in the Portuguese PCC to reduce AI in construction 
projects, 84.7% of respondents consider that it will be ben-
eficial for the construction sector, and only 14.3% consider 
its introduction still early due to the interoperability of 
models and the mentality of companies regarding the use 
of RC.
Table 5. Main characteristics of RC in combination with the BIM methodology that contribute to reducing AI  
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7818)
Characteristics of RC in combination with BIM RII Pearson’s correlation Cronbach’s alpha
B1 – Corrects problems in data flow 80% 0.9759 0.7774
B2 – Facilitates adding information to the model 89% 0.9393 0.7074
B3 – Interdependence between all project participants 89% 0.9393 0.7514
B4 – Integrated activities with a single and mutual goal 88% 0.9778 0.7875
B5 – Involvement of designers and contractor to increase value for the client 84% 0.9965 0.7341
B6 – Increased communication between the parties involved 86% 0.9558 0.7217
B7 – Definition of roles and responsibilities 88% 0.8944 0.7882
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Conclusions
Information asymmetric has been a crucial issue in project 
management for a long time, and some participants are 
usually more informed about some facts, while others are 
less informed. The asymmetric information phenomenon 
is counterproductive in public works construction projects 
and it is found that in Portugal there is a high probability 
of asymmetric information occurring and having a strong 
impact on the sector. Contractors do not share the nec-
essary information, which prevents them from getting 
involved in an integrated manner with the contracting 
parties. However, relational contracting supports different 
approaches that establish working relationships between 
stakeholders, involve win-win situations and enable better 
results, namely through the contractor’s involvement in 
the project. The aim of this study was to find in the Por-
tuguese public works construction sector the main char-
acteristics of relation contracting and its combination with 
the BIM methodology. Based on a survey conducted with 
specialists with solid experience and knowledge in con-
struction projects and BIM-IPD contracts, it was found 
that the probability of asymmetric information occurring 
in the Portuguese construction sector is very high and its 
impact is equally high. It can be concluded that the reduc-
tion of asymmetric information in public works construc-
tion projects is positively affected by relation contracting, 
with an average RII of 83% (Q1), and by the combination 
of relation contracting with the BIM methodology, with an 
average RII of 86% (Q2). Regarding the main characteris-
tics of relation contracting (Q1), it can be observed that it 
has a special relevance in complex projects, improves the 
attitude of project participants, promotes the cooperation 
of the parties involved, and increases teamwork and, con-
sequently, information sharing since the beginning of the 
project. On the other hand, the combination of relation 
contracting with the BIM methodology (Q2) facilitates 
adding information to the model, promotes a single and 
mutual goal as a result of increased communication and 
the correct definition of the roles and responsibilities of 
all project participants. Finally, 84.7% of respondents con-
sider it important to introduce the BIM methodology and 
relation contracting into the Portuguese Public Contracts 
Code to reduce asymmetric information and refer that the 
current national legislation does not provide for the re-
duction of asymmetric information, but they highlight its 
importance, particularly in the division of responsibilities. 
The major conclusion that we draw from our analysis 
is that the improved transparency from the use of BIM 
and relational contracting reduce the risk of information 
asymmetry. The risk of information asymmetry makes the 
information directly accessible by anyone at any time and 
ensures that the same information represented in the same 
way. The potential of BIM for sharing and visualizing in-
formation as well as considering changes in design and 
during execution, allows it to be shared transparently to 
the stakeholders, and reduce asymmetry information. 
This study is limited by the number of technicians with 
expertise in construction direction and management that 
have participated in BIM based IPD projects. A wider 
study needs to be carried out covering more cases across 
other countries. 
Future research can focus on the assessment of knowl-
edge management and its impact on reducing of asym-
metric information in construction projects, as well as on 
analyses based on case studies in construction companies 
regarding the advantages of relation contracting in com-
bination with the BIM methodology in the management 
of construction projects. The use of contract theory to ex-
amine how issues such as information asymmetry, adverse 
selection, opportunistic behaviour, and moral hazards 
materialise during the BIM Methodology in construction 
projects.
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